




Multiple agents, blame games and public policy-making: The case of local government 
reform in New South Wales 
 
Politicians often use ‘independent experts’ to avoid blame for contentious public policy. The 
use of multiple agents, however, has attracted relatively little attention. We extend the blame-
avoidance literature to identify additional opportunities and risks that arise when multiple 
agents are used to support/oppose particular public policies. We then test our propositions 
using evidence from recent local government reforms in New South Wales. The picture 
which emerges is largely one of confusion whereby independent agents provide contradictory 
opinions, attempt to shift blame to one another, and dispute interpretations of earlier advice. 
We conclude our analysis with a discussion of the salient factors for successful pursuit of the 
multiple-agent variant of the blame games. 
 









Politicians tasked with implementing public policy are faced with two problems. First, 
unpopular public policy generally involves high marginal cost, given that just ‘some, not all, 
voters need to pursue retribution as a voting objective for a politician’s office to be in danger’ 
(Weaver 1986: 378). Thus, office holders are provided with a rational choice incentive to use 
blame-avoidance strategies. Second, it is often difficult for politicians to know ex ante 
whether a public policy is likely to prove unpopular. Therefore, in most cases, the use of 
blame-avoidance strategies involves the potential sacrifice of political credit. 
 
Yet some public policy reforms are almost certain to engender community angst. One such 
policy is the compulsory amalgamation of local governments. For instance, it has been 
argued that the threat of electoral backlash against the Barnett conservative government in 
Western Australia stalled proposed amalgamations in Perth in 2015 (Goode 2015: 71). 
Similarly, the forced amalgamations in Queensland, Australia in 2008 attracted voter 
backlash, contributing to a 15.7 per cent swing against the incumbent Bligh Labor 
government at the 2012 state elections, then the largest swing in Australia’s political history 
(Grant, Dollery and Kortt 2015a: 489). Moreover, Allan (2003: 75) asserted that ‘public 
backlash to amalgamations … was perhaps the prime reason for the Kennett conservative 
government losing office’ in the Victorian state election of 1999. Against this background it 
might seem surprising that in 2015 the NSW government embarked on a program of 
amalgamations aimed at reducing the number of councils in the state by over a quarter, 
although explanations such as financial efficiency, gerrymander, a $1.3 billion saving over 20 
years and bowing to the developer lobby have all been tendered (Drew, Grant and Campbell 
2016). It is completely unsurprising, however, that NSW government politicians made efforts 






Hood (2007) identified a tripartite typology of blame-avoidance strategies used by 
politicians: presentational strategies, policy strategies and agency strategies. For Hood (2007) 
presentational strategies focus on political rhetoric, timing and diversionary tactics in order to 
limit the damage to incumbents (see Drew et al. 2016 for a discussion of the rhetoric 
surrounding these council amalgamations). Policy strategies include avoiding unpopular 
policy (which in this case would have meant not executing forced amalgamations), failing to 
provide services that may attract blame and relying on policies enacted by predecessors 
(Hood 2007). This article focuses principally on Hood’s (2007) third blame-avoidance 
strategy, agency approaches, but we acknowledge that there is an element of ‘presentation’ 
generally in the agency approach used by the NSW government. This is, however, quite 
distinct from ‘presentational strategies’ as conceived by Hood (2007). We suggest that, given 
both their prominence in explaining political behaviour and the fact that successful 
implementation of agency tactics can entirely eliminate the need for the other two types of 
blame-avoidance manoeuvres, agency strategies deserve to form the primary locus of inquiry. 
 
The single-agent approach to avoiding blame uses an independent agent or delegated senior 
bureaucrat to make recommendations for contentious public policy reform, often according to 
carefully constructed terms of reference. The holy grail of this approach is to achieve ‘blame 
shift’, whereby the delegated agent attracts the entire blame for contentious public policy 
reform. The consolation prize is ‘blame sharing’ between the principal and agent. 
Additionally, there is a possibility that ‘blame reversion’ will occur, wherein the public 







The literature has focused almost exclusively on the case of a single agent being used for 
blame-avoidance purposes. Yet politicians occasionally use multiple agents for purposes that 
may include blame avoidance and, indeed, there is evidence of increasing agencification of 
public policy (Mortensen 2016). For instance, in the Australian context, the NSW local 
government amalgamation program ‘Fit for the Future’ (FFTF) involved no less than six 
different ‘independent’ agents. Moreover, as we demonstrate in this context, the use of 
multiple agents opens up new risks and opportunities for politicians. We argue that our 
explication of matters arising from the use of multiple agents thus fills an important gap in 
the literature. It should be noted, however, that we do not assert that blame avoidance was the 
sole reason for the use of multiple expert agents in this particular instance: ‘We are unable to 
get inside the minds of ministers in order to ascertain the balance between conscious 
deliberations, general political instincts’ and genuine efforts to source expert advice for 
complex public policy (McConnell, Gauga and Botterill. 2008: 613). What we do assert is 
that the artefacts arising from the disputatious public policy under examination are consistent 
with, and cast light on, the proposition that use of multiple agents for blame-avoidance 
purposes has implications which are not considered in the blame-avoidance literature.  
 
The particular public policy program that forms our study can be sketched thus: following an 
extended period of consultation and inquiry stretching back to 2011, the NSW government’s 
reform package for local government, ‘launched’ in 2014 and entitled ‘Fit for the Future’ 
(OLG 2015a), required that councils demonstrate that they could meet performance 
benchmarks on seven metrics derived exclusively from financial data, plus a qualitative 
judgement concerning ‘adequate scale and capacity’. Despite prima facie evidence that the 
program of amalgamation rested on insufficient or questionable indicators distorted by 





achieve ‘fit’ status pursue the mergers initially proposed by the Independent Local 
Government Review Panel (ILGRP 2013), which relied heavily on the financial sustainability 
assessments prepared by the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp 2013). The Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART 2015a), with the assistance of Ernst & Young 
(2015), deemed 63 per cent of NSW local governments to be ‘unfit’ and the far majority of 
these assessments failed on the ‘adequate scale and capacity’ criteria. Councils were required 
to submit details of proposed mergers to the Office of Local Government (OLG) by 18 
November 2015 and the government announced amalgamation plans on 18 December 2015. 
 
In order to explore our various propositions with respect to the use of multiple agents for 
blame avoidance, or what might be termed ‘weapons of mass expertisation’ in this particular 
instance of public policy, the article is divided into five sections. The next section defines key 
concepts and reviews the literature on agency approaches to blame avoidance. Third, we 
examine explanations for the use of multiple agents and discuss the possible responses 
specific to a multiple-agent strategy. Fourth, the article examines artefacts from the FFTF 
program in order to test our explanations. We conclude with a consideration of the 
contributions of this case study to the corpus of multiple-agent blame-avoidance literature. 
 
Theories of blame avoidance 
Blame is the attribution of perceived loss or harm to a person or entity considered to have 
intentionally caused the loss or harm (Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe 2014). The reasons, 
obligations and capacity of the agent in causing loss or harm determine the degree of blame, 
and presentational and policy strategies for mitigating blame tend to focus on these factors. In 
contrast, agency strategies for mitigating blame seek to shift the attribution of loss or harm 





blame has an important temporal quality (Hood 2011): the perceived harm or loss may 
change over time as might the agent involved in the causal train of events. In fact, loss or 
harm need not have actually occurred; it is sufficient for it to be anticipated (Weaver 1986). 
Indeed, in the political domain blame may be apportioned to incumbents in the belief that the 
political opposition may have realised superior outcomes (Weaver 1986). 
 
A large body of research suggests that most individuals tend to have a negativity bias (see, 
for instance, Heath, Larrick and Wu 1999). Otherwise stated, individuals are inclined to be 
more sensitive to losses than gains of the same magnitude. In political terms this would mean, 
for example, that a 1 per cent loss in opinion polls might be felt more keenly than a 1 per cent 
gain. This leads to the conclusion that more effort will be expended on blame avoidance than 
on credit claiming (Hood 2011). Indeed, ‘persons who have suffered losses are more likely to 
notice the loss, to feel aggrieved and to act on that grievance, than gainers are to act on the 
basis of their improved state’ (Weaver 1986: 373). Moreover, the marginal costs of changes 
to public opinion are extremely high, and politicians can rarely be sure of the outcomes from 
public policy initiatives. Thus a rational choice model for political decision-making is likely 
to predict that politicians will be prepared to forego the credit-claiming possibilities of direct 
control in favour of protection from blame afforded by agency strategies (Hood 2007). 
 
Agent-centred approaches to blame avoidance 
There are three possible outcomes arising from the use of an agency approach to mitigating 
blame. The optimal outcome of agency strategies is to shift blame entirely onto a delegated 
entity or individual – the so called ‘lightning rod’ strategy (see, for instance, Ellis 1994). This 
complete shift of blame is dependent on two salient factors: the degree to which voters expect 





blame. With the advent of increased media scrutiny and diverse communication options for 
protecting reputation, it is probably unrealistic to expect a complete ‘blame shift’ to occur 
(Mortensen 2013). The consolation prize of ‘blame sharing’ is therefore a more likely 
proposition.  
 
Given the high marginal cost of voters seeking retribution, any reduction in blame attribution 
is still worthwhile from the perspective of a politician in office (Weaver 1986). Yet 
politicians must use blame-avoidance strategies judiciously. For instance, blame sharing 
might be subject to diminishing returns – that is, the advantages of delegation will reduce 
according to the frequency with which the tactic is used (Hood 2002). 
 
If ‘blame shifting’ is the holy grail of agency strategy and ‘blame sharing’ a respectable 
consolation prize, then ‘blame reversion’ must be the nightmare of every politician using 
blame-avoidance strategies. ‘Blame reversion’ may occur where (1) the public perceive that 
delegation is a sham designed to avoid blame, or (2) the delegate successfully passes blame 
back by prosecuting the case that their recommendation is the outcome of restrictive terms of 
reference or (3) the public perceives that the politician has manipulated the delegated agent 
behind the scenes (see, for instance, Grant, Ryan and Lawrie 2015b). Where blame reversion 
occurs it means that the agency strategy has been worse than futile, for it is quite likely that 
the politician will receive additional blame for trying to deflect blame in the first instance 
(Hood 2011).  
 
If we consider instances where multiple agents are used, the possible outcomes arising from 
agency strategies to avoid blame are expanded somewhat. For instance, we can postulate that, 





enhanced possibilities via ‘blame confusion’ and ‘blame destruction’. The strategy of using 
multiple agents, however, also brings with it heightened risks for political actors. 
 
Additional opportunities and risks arising from use of multiple agents  
The use of multiple agents could be explained on the basis that it brings in additional 
expertise and different perspectives on public policy formulation. Yet where the expertise is 
subsequently discarded, or multiple experts are brought in with similar skills, this may 
suggest that the agents may have been engaged principally for the purpose of mitigating 
blame. 
 
Weaver (1986) and Hood (2002, 2007, 2011) have both alluded to the usefulness of engaging 
multiple experts in order to diffuse blame. Weaver (1986: 388) referred to the practice as 
‘circling the wagons’ whilst Hood (2011) described the behaviour as a ‘herding instinct’ – 
both descriptions convey an air of desperate predicament (see Drew et al. 2016). The 
suggestion appears to be that a fixed quantum of blame distributed between multiple agents 
results in smaller portions of shared blame for each agent – a ‘safety in numbers’ argument. 




Blame confusion works on two important components of blame: agency and time. If a 
succession of different agents are engaged for public policy formulation over discrete periods 
of time, the result may well be a moving target ‘that deprives all but the most determined of 
their blame quarry’ (Hood 2011: 81). In addition, each delegated agent is presented with the 





blame downwards by claiming that they are merely following the direction and 
recommendations set out by predecessors, whilst earlier agents can counter-claim that their 
work has been misrepresented. Critically, as long as agents are intent on shifting portions of 
blame to one another, the (theoretically) accountable politician can largely escape scrutiny. 
Moreover, a convoluted dialogue of this type will prove difficult for the ‘sound bite’ media to 
follow and may result in less media scrutiny for the specific public policy reform. Thus, 
blame confusion might be defined as the situation in which citizens find it difficult to 
attribute blame, owing to problems in determining which agent was responsible for what part 
of the public policy at any given time. 
 
Blame destruction 
Under this line of reasoning, multiple agents might be deployed to project the image that the 
weight of expert opinion is in favour of the proposed public policy reform and that politicians 
have studiously sought the best available evidence as part of a comprehensive consultation 
process. If sufficient numbers of high-profile experts can be engaged on the project, then this 
may dissuade potential dissenters from investigating the matter. After all, if it appears that a 
number of experts have contributed to policy formulation then it is hardly likely to be flawed. 
 
Key to this strategy is the ‘expert brand’. Therefore, a politician seeking to use multiple 
agents will endeavour to enlist agents with the salutation of ‘professor’ and agencies well 
regarded in their field of expertise. It is also important for voters to perceive that the agents 
have made their recommendations without interference from the relevant politician. Hence, 
agents with the keyword ‘independent’ are likely to feature in the blame-destruction approach 
(e.g., Grant et al. 2015b). In essence, reliance on an expert brand is argumentum ad 






Under this line of reasoning, should the strategy fail to eliminate dissention entirely, it might 
still serve a useful purpose for the blame-avoidance objective. The fact that a number of 
prominent experts support the public policy means that dissenting parties must face the 
additional challenge of justifying their position in the face of apparent overwhelming support 
for the policy. It is entirely possible that dissenters will struggle to gain credibility if 
prominent ‘expert’ brands are paraded behind the policy. Therefore, even when the objective 
of blame destruction has not been achieved, the consolation prize may be muted dissention. 
 
Thus blame destruction differs from extant blame-shift explanations of behaviour by 
focussing on the persuasive power of multiple-expert brands. It is not so much about shifting 
blame, but rather convincing citizens that the weight of expert opinion supports the public 
policy, therefore suggesting little cause for attributing blame (to anyone).  
 
Risks in deploying multiple agents 
There are also a number of risks in using multiple agents (in addition to blame reversion, as 
discussed earlier in the article). First, if individual agents become passionate in their attempt 
to deflect blame, consistent with Moynihan’s (2012: 571) observation that agents are 
‘governed by concern for [their external] reputation’, there is a real risk that the whole project 
could descend into a chaotic brawl. Should this occur, the public response may be to transfer 
blame back to the politician accountable for overseeing the process. Second, if ‘expert 
brands’ do not carry out their roles in an expert fashion, then an accusation could be made 
that the experts were simply guns for hire, and blame destruction may fail to occur. Attention 
may then fall on the cost of engaging multiple agents, particularly where agents exercise 





ministerial proclamation, then the deployment of multiple agents may simply delay the 
attribution of blame rather than avoid same. 
 
Given the additional downside risks associated with multiple agents, one might question why 
a politician would use such an approach. One simple response is that politicians are imbued 
with a disproportionate sense of confidence in their ability to manage agents, media and the 
wider public. An alternative response is derived from Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) 
prospect theory, which posits inter alia that, when faced with a high-risk prospect, individuals 
will tend to be risk-seeking (see Heath et al. 1999 for experimental research). As noted 
earlier, forced municipal amalgamations are established as a high-probability risk prospect in 
the Australian political milieu. Thus, the acceptance of additional risks can be understood 
with reference to prospect theory. We now consider the multiple agents deployed as part of 
the NSW municipal amalgamation program in order to explicate our theoretical insights. 
 
Multiple-agent artefacts 
To date, six agencies have been involved with the FFTF program. Figure 1 details the 
chronology of the municipal reform program from August 2011 through to December 2015, 
with the curved arrows depicting attempts of the various agents to cast blame forward or 
backwards during the four years. As one will likely note, there is every indication that the 
various agents were far from passive recipients of blame. We review the contribution of each 
agency with emphasis on the risks and opportunities specific to a multiple-agent approach to 
blame avoidance. Representative artefacts were selected from a comprehensive review of all 
the materials associated with the program. We concentrated on ‘direct citations and inclusion 
of a very broad selection of statements [which] reduces systematic bias’ (Mortensen 2016: 7). 





when compared with popular alternatives such as systematic coding that rely on a myriad of 
subjective ‘judgements about how to code text’ (McConnell et al. 2008; Moynihan 2012: 
575).  
 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) 
FFTF had its genesis in a rather innocuous forum comprising councillors, academics and state 
government officials billed as ‘Destination 2036’ and held in August 2011. It was described 
as a collaborative enterprise ‘reflect[ing] the NSW Government’s commitment to work 
constructively with local government’ (Elton Consulting 2011: 3). One output from the forum 
was a comforting and aspirational ‘Vision Statement’ which promised inter alia ‘strong 
communities through partnership … led and served by strong, effective and democratically 
elected local government’ (Destination 2036 Implementation Steering Committee 2012: 8). A 
second output was the establishment of the ILGRP to ‘draw on independent expertise’ to 
‘identify how councils can best govern and be structured to support the wellbeing and 
prosperity of NSW communities’ (Destination 2036 Implementation Steering Committee 
2012: 4).  
 
From the outset, the government emphasised the ‘expert brand’ of the ILGRP. For instance, 
the media release announcing the formation of the Panel referred to it as ‘independent’ and 
‘expert,’ noting twice that a ‘professor’ was the chair and that Sansom ‘currently heads up the 
Australian Centre for Excellence in Local Government’ (Page 2012a). The other two Panel 
members were also presented as ‘fellow local government experts’ (Page 2012a) with 





included references to ‘independence’, ‘expertise’ and the leadership of Sansom (e.g., Page 
2012a; 2012b; 2013).  
 
The Panel produced several reports, then a ‘Final Report’ detailing 65 recommendations 
which included ‘structural reform – including council amalgamations – [as] another essential 
component of reform’ (ILGRP 2013: 15). Yet the Panel produced no empirical evidence to 
support its recommendations, and academics and opposition politicians were quick to pounce 
on this oversight (Drew and Dollery 2015; GPSC 2015). Notwithstanding the absence of 
empirical support, the Panel produced a list of ‘options for amalgamation’ that formed the 
bulk of the report. It is therefore surprising that Sansom later published claims that academics 
had misrepresented the Panel’s options for amalgamations as ‘merger recommendations’ 
(Sansom 2015b). Later still, Sansom (2015a: 3) levelled the same charge at the Independent 
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART; discussed below) noting that: 
in its final report, the Panel did indeed put forward a number of ‘Preferred 
Options’ for mergers, but in every case it offered an alternative in case 
subsequent detailed examination of the merger proposal (or Government policy) 
pointed in a different direction. 
 
Sansom also criticised FFTF implementation, asserting that ‘the ILGRP’s broader package 
has been somewhat overshadowed by FFTF’s perceived focus on financial ratios and 
benchmarks’ (Sansom 2015b: 1). These seem to be salient examples of a delegate’s attempts 
to shift blame. Notably, Sansom sought to shift blame to another delegated agent in addition 
to attempting blame reversion (Davies 2015). Yet the media largely failed to pick up on the 
story and the government continues to claim that FFTF represents its response to the findings 





ILGRP website (OLG 2015a). The Hansard record states that the ILGRP cost $1.8 million 
(State Parliament of NSW 2015: 9). 
 
New South Wales Treasury Corporation (TCorp) 
TCorp also played a delegated role in the formulation of the FFTF public policy reform. 
TCorp was commissioned by the then Division of Local Government to review the financial 
sustainability of all NSW councils (TCorp 2013). Later the DLG ‘expanded the scope of 
TCorp’s reports to incorporate additional material to facilitate use by the Review Panel 
[ILGRP], particularly in respect of the area of financial sustainability’ (TCorp 2013: 5). The 
task involved establishing a definition of financial sustainability, collecting data and 
constructing 10 financial ratios, establishing benchmarks for the ratios and weighting the 
ratio performance of each council in order to produce a financial sustainability rating on a 
continuum, ranging from ‘distressed’ through to ‘very strong’. Yet the TCorp methodology 
appears to have lacked transparency, as well as omitting relevant metrics testified to in the 
literature, and this attracted some criticism (Drew and Dollery 2014). Despite these apparent 
problems, the ILGRP (2013: 4) relied heavily on the work of TCorp as justification for 
radical reforms, stating that: ‘The recently released report of the NSW Treasury Corporation 
(TCorp) paints a disturbing picture of a local government system facing major financial 
problems with apparently little awareness of just how serious the situation has become’.  
 
The NSW government emphasised the ‘expert brand’ of TCorp, noting that it ‘is the central 
borrowing authority for the State of NSW’ and that it ‘is a manager of asset and liability 
portfolios on behalf of clients, providing financial risk management and investment 
management services to the NSW Government and its constituent businesses’ (OLG 2015b). 





10). It is therefore somewhat surprising that the OLG (on the advice of IPART 2014) 
subsequently discarded most of the financial ratios in formulating the FFTF criteria (just 5 of 
the 10 financial ratios were used by the OLG). TCorp (2015: 1) appeared to express 
frustration at this turn of events, noting that it ‘has been working on the assessment of local 
government sustainability since 2011’ and criticising the subsequent agent (IPART) 
methodology for assessing council ‘fitness’ as ‘not consistent with the guidance material 
provided to councils and their representatives’. Moreover, TCorp (2015) criticised the 
dichotomous financial sustainability assessment process subsequently used by IPART (in 
preference to the earlier work of TCorp), remarking that failure to meet the benchmark for 
one ratio ‘does not in itself, make them [councils] unsustainable’ (TCorp 2015: 3). It is 
noteworthy that TCorp chose to blame IPART for a poor application of its earlier work, 
rather than the OLG or the Minister for Local Government. 
 
Office of Local Government (OLG) 
The OLG played a pivotal role in the FFTF program. As the Minister for Local Government’s 
department, the OLG set the strategic framework for reform (GPSC 2015). This included 
providing advice to the Minister on the metrics used to assess municipal ‘fitness’, developing 
the council FFTF templates and self-assessment tools, delivering FFTF marketing material 
and developing the council ‘response to IPART assessment’ templates (GPSC 2015: 11). The 
OLG itself was re-branded (formerly known as the Department of Premier & Cabinet, 
Division of Local Government) prior to the launch of FFTF to signify ‘that the organisation is 
now a stand-alone agency’ (State Government of NSW 2015: 11).  
 
The OLG came in for criticism in an Upper House Inquiry into FFTF, particularly in relation 





the OLG explained that the criteria were ‘developed based on the recommendations and work 
of the NSW Treasury Corporation, the Independent Panel and the Infrastructure Audit, and 
were reviewed by IPART prior to finalisation’ (GPSC 2015: 19). In so doing, the OLG 
appear to have sought to shift the blame to other delegated agents involved in the public 
policy reform. Moreover, the Chief Executive of the OLG, Marcia Doheny, received a harsh 
media response to her evidence, with particular emphasis placed on her ‘embarrassing 
backdown when conceding she did not know what impact council mergers would have on 
rates’ (McKenny 2015). A short media release was later issued by the Minister explaining 
that Doheny ‘would leave the organisation for personal reasons’ (Toole 2015a) just five 
months after taking up the position. Notably blame appears to have been shifted onto an 
individual within the organisation who was not used by the OLG at the time that FFTF was 
rolled out. 
 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) 
IPART had two key roles in the development of FFTF. In September 2014, it produced a 
report for the Premier of NSW – Review of Criteria for Fit for the Future – which provided 
advice on which metrics should be used to determine whether councils were ‘fit’. Notably, 
IPART (2014: 5) advised the Premier to set a benchmark for the asset maintenance ratio at 
‘greater than 1’, introduce a debt service ratio of ‘greater than 0% and less than or equal to 
20%’ and endorsed ‘opex per head’ as a measure of efficiency. All these recommendations 
came in for sustained criticism in the Upper House inquiry (GPSC 2015). IPART later 
clarified its position on the asset maintenance and debt ratios less than a month out from the 
FFTF submission date (GPSC 2015: 86), prompting one seasoned observer to ‘suggest that 






IPART’s second role in the FFTF program was its appointment, along with ‘South Australian 
local government expert John Comrie, [to] act as the Expert Advisory Panel to review local 
councils FFTF submissions’ (Toole 2015b: 1). In announcing the appointment, Toole said 
that ‘IPART has extensive local government expertise and proven experience’ and that 
‘councils and communities deserve these proposals to be assessed with consistency, fairness 
and impartiality’ (Toole 2015b: 1). Once again, the media release seems to have emphasised 
the ‘expert brand’.  
 
The principal role of the Expert Advisory Panel was to determine whether each council was 
‘fit’ or ‘unfit’ according to what has been widely regarded as an ill-defined scale and capacity 
criteria, along with seven metrics constructed from the financial statements. Yet before the 
determinations had commenced IPART (2015b: 73) was at pains to distance itself from the 
criteria used for FFTF, stating no less than 20 times in its assessment methodology report 
words to the effect that ‘the benchmarks and measures have been established by the 
Government and although we received suggestions to alter some of these in our consultation 
process, it is not our role to reconsider or change them’ (emphasis added). Moreover, IPART 
(2015b: 10) noted no less than 10 times that they had been engaged only to make assessments 
of a council’s fitness and that the question of forced amalgamation would be ‘a matter for the 
Government’. 
 
IPART appears to have sought to ensure that other delegated agents would receive a portion 
of any blame accruing as a result of forced amalgamation decisions. For instance, IPART 
(2015a: 1) noted that the criteria were ‘developed by the Government based on the work of 
Destination 2036, the assessments of the sector by the ILGRP and the NSW Treasury 





response to criticisms raised about IPART’s involvement in developing the apparently flawed 
assessment metrics. Moreover, in its ‘Final Report’ IPART (2015a) made a number of 
references to the ILGRP ‘merger recommendations’ which it used as the basis for 
establishing the ‘adequate scale and capacity’ criteria. Indeed, IPART reproduced large 
sections of the ILGRP report so that there could be no doubt about the source of the merger 
recommendations (e.g., IPART 2015a: 44–9). The cost of the IPART work has not been 
publicly disclosed. 
 
Thus it is clear that the actions of IPART are consistent with an organisation desirous to 
ensure that any blame associated with FFTF would be shared between the government and all 
delegated agents. IPART also delegated work to Ernst & Young, to either address gaps in the 
Expert Advisory Panel expertise or attempt to shift blame to another agent. Given the 
Minister’s statement (Toole 2015b: 1) that IPART ‘was appointed after careful consideration’ 
of its ‘extensive local government expertise’, it is not unreasonable to suggest the latter 
explanation might be the case. 
 
Ernst & Young (EY) 
Ernst & Young is one of the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms in the world and is thus a prominent 
‘expert brand’. The EY report, Fit for the future: Review of business case estimates of merger 
net benefits for Sydney metropolitan councils, clearly marked ‘confidential’, is included as an 
addendum to the IPART fitness assessment report. Indeed, EY (2015: 74) specifically notes 
that ‘if IPART wishes to provide a third party with copies of the Report, then our prior 
written consent must be obtained’. It is important to note that the involvement of EY was not 
part of the Expert Advisory Panel announcements and we can find no public announcement 






The EY report is replete with caveats and apparent blame-shifting devices. For instance, EY 
made reference to ‘information and time constraints’ which they cited as reason for not 
conducting a ‘detailed deep “bottom up” review of the costs, benefits and risks of a merger’ 
as would be done in the case of commercial transactions (EY 2015: 3). Moreover, EY noted 
that ‘we have not independently verified, or accept any responsibility for independently 
verifying any information provided to us by IPART or information obtained in the public 
domain for the purposes of this review, nor do we make any representation as to the accuracy 
or completeness of the information’ (EY 2015: 4). EY also stated that ‘all the information we 
have received is the responsibility of IPART and the relevant councils’ and that ‘underlying 
assumptions and projections contained with this Report are subject to significant uncertainties 
and contingencies often outside the control of EY’ (EY 2015: 16). 
 
It thus appears that EY invested some effort into articulating caveats in order to escape 
potential blame. The cost of this ‘expert branding’ has not been publicly disclosed. 
 
KPMG 
When the NSW government (2015b) announced which councils would be 
amalgamated, it detailed precise estimates of the ‘total financial benefits over 20 
years’ for each of the proposed amalgamations. This information was presented on a 
dedicated ‘council boundary review’ website (NSW government 2015a) along with a 
prominent declaration that the benefits were ‘informed by four years of extensive 
council and community consultation, supported by independent analysis and 
modelling by KPMG’ (NSW government 2015a). In addition, a report dated 





promptly uploaded to the website asserts inter alia a three-year payback period for 
merger costs, $100 million annual total financial benefit for affected councils, and a 
$1.3 billion nett financial saving over 20 years (KPMG 2015: 2). The report contains 
no information regarding the assumptions used in the modelling, and states that ‘Its 
preparation has relied upon information sourced from annual data returns and long 
term financial plans of individual councils and a variety of other publicly available 
sources. Neither KPMG nor the NSW Government has independently verified such 
information’ (KPMG 2015: 2). 
 
Immediately calls were made for details of the assumptions underpinning the modelling of 
purported benefits arising from each of the amalgamation proposals. A number of councils 
and politicians lodged applications under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 
(GIPA) (2009) (e.g., NSW Government Department of Premier & Cabinet, 2016). In January 
2016, KPMG’s report for the state government about financial modelling for local 
government mergers was released (KPMG 2016). Reaction to a number of perceived flaws in 
the report was swift. Specifically, the KPMG report was criticised for: (1) using the incorrect 
industrial award to calculate redundancy costs, (2) using assumptions inconsistent with other 
KPMG reports,
1
 (3) entirely overlooking the considerable expense associated with service 
harmonisation
2
 and (4) making assumptions without evidential foundation.
3
 These prima 
facie damaging critiques of the report remain unanswered by the government and KPMG. 
Individual modelling for various amalgamation proposals has not been released: the GIPA 
                                                          
1
 For instance, the KPMG report assumes savings from efficiency in delivering materials and contracts for rural 
councils in the order of 2 per cent. Yet in a report produced eight months earlier for a rural council KPMG 
assumed this saving to be 1.5 per cent (Dollery 2016). 
 
2
 When two councils amalgamate, differences in service quantity and quality must be ameliorated. Generally, 
‘service harmonisation’ occurs at the highest level of services previously enjoyed by the residents of constituent 
municipalities (Steiner 2003). 
3
 Evidence arising from the 2008 Queensland amalgamations contradicted the KPMG assumptions relating to 





determination states that the documents are ‘cabinet documents’ and ‘that there is an 
overriding public interest against disclosure of the information and access to the information 
is refused’ (NSW Government Department of Premier & Cabinet 2016). The KPMG 
independent modelling cost $400,000 (Robertson 2016). 
 
Effects of the multiple-agent approach 
The artefacts detailed above could be used for prosecuting the case that multiple agents were 
used for blame-avoidance purposes. This reading of events finds support from: (1) the 
commissioning of multiple agents with overlapping expertise (for example, EY, TCorp and 
KPMG), (2) the discarding of expert outputs (for instance, the omission of half of TCorp’s 
financial sustainability ratios in council assessments) and (3) the care taken to establish 
independent expert brands. 
 
Our analysis has gone well beyond the scant literature on multiple-agency approaches for 
blame avoidance, which has hitherto focussed on blame sharing and observed that higher 
numbers of agents present a higher risk of blame being cast between agents. By focussing on 
two explanations for deploying multiple agents – blame confusion and blame destruction – 
within a single case study, we have identified the salient factors necessary for the successful 
pursuit of the multiple-agent variant of the blame games. 
 
First, we have shown that those who might choose to use multiple agents to pursue 
contentious public policy have no reason to believe that the agents will be passive recipients 
of blame. As Figure 1 attests, all six agents were prepared to pass blame to other agents. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis in the literature that a ‘slew of different organisations offer 






Our case study, however, suggests a departure from the findings of earlier research. For 
instance, Moynihan (2012) suggested that the likelihood of an agent attempting to blame 
others is positively associated with the proportion of resources which an agent derives from 
external parties. If this were the case then we might have expected EY and KPMG to have 
been most active in attempting to shift blame to other agents. Yet blame cast by these two 
agents was muted. Instead EY and KPMG focussed on stating caveats to the effect that: (1) 
they did ‘not verify or accept responsibility for independently verifying any information 
provided to us’ (EY 2015: 4) and (2) the modelling of financial benefits from amalgamation 
was consistent with the finding of other agents (KPMG 2015).  
 
Possible explanations for this behaviour include the chronology of the agents’ engagement 
(having been engaged towards the end of the process the agents were not in a position to cast 
much blame upwards), and the possibility that a professional code of ethics made the agents 
reluctant to participate in a public bun fight (professionals such as accountants and medical 
practitioners tend to avoid disputes in the media). It is also possible that these particular 
agents did not regard it as a worthy use of their time to further deflect blame. These 
observations present fruitful avenues for further research. 
 
The second major finding is that efforts to engage and promote prominent expert brands are 
largely undermined if the experts fail to act in an expert fashion. In our case study, the most 
prominent failure probably belongs to KPMG, which produced a report ‘replete with … 
errors of logic, gross oversimplifications and mistakes’ (Dollery 2016). This assessment was 
picked up by a number of media outlets and this largely undermined the blame-destruction 





expert brands in neutralising blame destruction. As noted earlier, the use of multiple expert 
agents means that potential dissenters face an additional challenge of justifying their position 
in the face of apparent overwhelming support. Our case study emphasises that ‘expert brands’ 
are thus equally important for those wishing to dispute public policy.  
 
Notably, in our case study blame confusion failed to set in, and this finding seems to be in 
contrast to the contention that a succession of multiple agents engaged over discrete periods 
of time will present a moving target ‘that deprives all but the most determined of their blame 
quarry’ (Hood 2011: 81). For instance, the announcement of the final forced amalgamations 
was met with headlines clearly attributing the action to the state government: 
 
• NSW councils to merge under State Government plan for forced 
amalgamations: 2016 elections delayed (ABC 2015; emphasis added); 
 
• Bulldozed: Mike Baird to force Sydney councils to merge, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Davies and McKenny 2015; emphasis added). 
 
Part of the reason for this failure to deprive the media of its blame quarry might well be the 
rigorous interrogation of consultant outputs by determined academics (highlighting the 
importance of independent academic scrutiny of public policy). Alternatively, it might be 
conjectured that the media is far more tenacious than previously considered in the literature. 
 
A third explanation may be the salience of the mechanism required to effect the public policy 
decision. Under §218F of the Local Government Act (1993), the Minister must recommend 





Thus, in instances such as this, where the government is required to trigger the public policy 
recommendation, it seems that this act might refocus the media’s attention on the 
government’s ultimate responsibility for the public policy change. Future comparative studies 
might investigate the importance of legislative triggers in pursuing blame-confusion 
strategies. 
 
Finally, our case study illustrates that blame destruction and blame confusion  are in no way 
mutually exclusive. Neither mechanism proved to be wholly successful in the final analysis, 
but this was largely due to the problems outlined above (experts not acting in an expert 
fashion, presence of vocal alternative expert brands, tenacity of media and scholars, and the 
salience of the legislative trigger). In particular, it seems that, had the experts conducted 
themselves in an expert fashion, there would have been little for vocal alternative expert 
brands to criticise and hence attract little interest from the media. We conclude that 
politicians can use weapons of mass expertisation for both blame-confusion and blame-
destruction, but they must use these mechanisms carefully if they are to be effective. 
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